Why Nations Go To War

wherefore NATIONS GO TO WAR is a unique oblige and a mathematical product of reflection by author, Dr. John G. Stoessinger. first gear published in 1978, its Eleventh variance with profits came give away in 2010. It is built well-nigh ten instance studies, culminating in the saucy state of warf arfares that ushered in the twenty-first speed of light Iraq, Afghanistan, and the wars in the midst of Arabs and Israelis in Gaza and in Lebanon. In the script he analyses the nigh serious multitude conflicts of the 20th century First valet de chambres War, operation Barbarossa, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the war in Yugoslavia, the India-Pakistan conflict etc.The distinguishing feature of the withstand is the authors accent on the frigid role of the personalities of attracters who stick their nations, or their following, across the wand into war. Thus this book transmits an understanding of warfargon from universe War I to the record century. Dr. Stoessinger believes that the war is neither impersonal, nor inevitable, arguing that the state for a war doesnt lie only when with certain events, because e actuallything is, in fact, about the decisions that muckle make.He argues that galore(postnominal) conflicts could pick out been avoided without the use of displume or without going to war. Dr. John G. Stoessinger attend college at Grinnell College in Iowa as an undergraduate and completed his Ph. D. in military manwide dealingss at Harvard. He has taught at several(prenominal) universities including Harvard, MIT, Columbia, Princeton, and the University of San Diego, where he is currently a idealistic Professor of Global Diplomacy. In addition to his t apieceing career, Dr. Stoessinger has as well led the International Seminar on International Relations at Harvard in 1969.He was excessively the key none speaker unit at the initiation Congress of subaltern Chamber International during their fiftieth day of remembrance event in Kobe, Japan. Dr. Stoessinger has written ten books on multinational relations and was awarded the Bancroft dough for The Might of Nations World Politics in Our Time. He has served as the book analyze editor of Foreign Affairs, acting handler of the Political Affairs Division of the f wholly in Nations, and is a member of the Council of Foreign Relations. He has been included in Whos Who in America and Whos Who in the World. Dr.Stoessinger is illustrious for his individual analyses of war, contrasted with the systemic views to a greater extent usually studied by policy-making scientists after(prenominal)ward the Second World War. Stoessinger was only a child when Adolf Hitler invaded his home of Austria in rescript to obtain Anschluss. As a Jewish family, they needed to escape from the Nazis. They received a visa to Shanghai, china from Chiune Sugihara, a Nipp wizardse diplomat who sufficeed thousands of Jews escape from the Nazis. These were the beginnings that sha ped Dr. Stoessingers universe of discourse view and interest in WHY NATIONS GO TO WAR.In the books introduction, Dr. Stoessinger tells how, when he was a student, he was of all time dissatisfied with the ex excogitationations found in explanation books regarding wars nationalism, militarism, alliance systems, economic factors and contrastive perfect causes that, according to him, couldnt be instantly linked to the precise mo man index numbert of a wars beginning. He argues that these entire causes of wars throughout history are those forces that battalion homelyly dont control, although it is sight who lie at the base of a conflict.In analyzing the 10 conflicts presented in the book, Dr. Stoessinger searches for the moment of right, the one in which the leaders take the fatal step towards the war, and he wonders in which precise moment the decision to go to war becomes irreversible, who takes right for it and if the disasters could have been avoided. Dr. Stoessinger has correct up his book to look at the events that led to specific wars of the twentieth century and then drawing parallels between the several(predicate) wars that might not have been patent or obvious at the multiplication of the various conflicts.The book closely examines each war or group of wars in individual chapters arranged in a near chronological order with a conclusion chapter that pulls from all of the conflicts previously presented. This entree is very well organized and helps the reviewer to follow the organic evolution of war styles. The books first chapter is dedicated to World War I and is expressively authorize The Iron Dice, referring to the famous words utter on August 1st by German chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg If the iron dice must roll, may God help usIn general, because of the history taught in schools or because of popular history books, nearly volume consider that the so-called wakeless causes of World War I are the deteriorating poise of power in europium and the new competitive alliances, the arms race, Ger umteens militarism and her claims regarding a larger colonial conglomerate etc. Loyal to his theory, Stoessinger ignores these causes and chooses to analyze the leaders movements in the wars eve. According to the author, all of the political leaders snarled were aware of the wars inevitability and, in spite of this, they couldnt retrovert it.More than once, these leaders have denied their responsibility, placing it in the hands of God or destiny. just now it wasnt God who could control the evolution of events and stop the war, was he? Dr. Stoessingers of import theory is that the events werent, in fact, incontrollable and that it was the throng who make the crucial decisions. And these people werent nigh evil leaders with a appetite for blood and destruction (how the Kaiser is so often portrayed), exclusively worried people stuck privileged their experience semblances.Stoessinger believes that the crucial events that pushed the European countries to war were the following 1) The pledge that Ger some do to Austria-Hungary regarding her indemnity towards Serbia 2) The ultimatum Vienna gave to Serbia and its rejection by the Serbs 3) The German efforts to in-between the conflict and tame Austria 4) At last, the settlement of war made by Germany against Russia and the onslaught of Luxembourg and Belgium. In the first region of his novel, The Iron Dice The causes of WW1, Stoessinger offer an puntary explanation of the causes of World War I, one that includes human reactions and feelings.He says The notion that WW1 is beyond mens control is scathe Mortals made these decisions. They made them in fear and in tremble but they made them nonetheless. In nearly cases, the decision makers were not evil people bent on destruction but were frightened and entrapped by self-delusion. They based their policies on fears, not facts, and were singularly devoid of empathy. Mis experie nce, kinda than conscious evil design, appears to have been the tether villain in the drama. Although Dr. Stoessingers essay is well feeling out and well written, It is tight to agree to the thesis completely.It seems that all the European countries had good reasons for wanting(p) a war as well. Serbia was right in wanting to expand, Austria in wanting to survive. Germany was right in fearing isolation, Great Britain in fearing German power. any these countries needed to rent war since the balance of power was no longer balanced. entirely of these countries had good motives for a war, therefore, it is illogical to maneuver the blame just upon the leaders of those countries, or else than analyzing the mickle that made the countries want to wage war.As much as we would all akin things to be simple, they are not. Finding a couple of unfortunate leaders in power guilty seems to be the easiest solution. yet, the right is just not that simple. The truth is that everyone wa s to blame, the circumstances that created the need for war, the short war illusion that everyone entertained, and the governments who felt the need for a war. The responsibility of preventing World War One rests not solely upon the shoulders of a few selected individuals. However that is the theory maintained by Dr. Stoessinger throughout the book.The distinguishing feature of the text throughout the book remains the authors emphasis on the pivotal role of the personalities of leaders who take their nations or their following across the threshold into war. more or less statesmen who made the crucial decisions behaved like fatalists. The mischievous denouement was foreseen, but couldnt been prevented. Historians have been bear upon by this fatalistic attitude (events passing game beyond mens control). Stoessingers view is that this is injure mortals made decisions basing their policies on fear, not facts. Stoessinger views the World War I as preventable.The perception of states men and generals were absolutely crucial. Following dimensions of this phenomenon 1. A leadership science OF HIMSELF 2. HIS PERCEPTION OF HIS ADVERSARYS CHARACTER 3. HIS PERCEPTION OF HIS ADVERSARYS INTENTIONS 4. HIS PERCEPTIONS OF HIS ADVERSARYS POWER AND CAPABILITIES 5. HIS CAPACITY FOR EMPATHY WITH HIS ADVERSARY close to leaders saw themselves as stronger than they unfeignedly were and their adversaries as weaker than they really were. These misperceptions led instantly to distorted perceptions of adversarial intentions which then precipitated quickly into all out war.If the leaders of the various nations involved would have viewed reality rather than their own distorted misperceptions, it may have been manageable to avoid conflict on such a massive scale or even avoid war altogether. This seems to be a recurring theme throughout the book. One of the important theories attributed to Stoessinger is the theory of perceptions. Stoessinger believes that, in the eve of major co nflicts, many of the political leaders involved have misjudged the speckle and have thus led their countries to war.These treasonably perceptions manifest on 4 levels firstly, a false perception regarding the leaders own person, of their role in the world and of their loyalty towards the possible outcome of the conflict. The second level regards the opponent and often includes demonizing his motion picture and the inability to objectively understand a situation. On the leash level, we are dealing with the misperception of the opponents intentions and, on the fourth level, with misjudging the opponents abilities.Stoessinger has emphasized the splendour of the political leaders personalities and the fundamental billet they play in the evolution of international relations. The second chapter discusses Hitler and his invasion of Russia in 1941. Again, misperceptions compete a key role in the events that unfolded. This time, more emphasis was put on the character of the aggressor and his adversary. Hitler essentially had a one track mind. He resolute to antiaircraft and eliminate the Russian people and paid no attention to the lessons conditioned by catnap when he had seek to conquer Russia.Hitler was convinced that it would be a quick and easy victory. Stalin, on the former(a) hand, believed that since they had previously been allies, Hitler would not invade Russia. Stalin interminably do by intelligence that came from British and American sources, including eighty-four warnings in the year precedent the attack, because he was suspicious of Anglo-American motives. He best-loved to place his trust in Hitler, a fellow dictator. In the end, Hitler invaded Russia and had misjudged the Russian people.They were armed combat for their very existence which is probably the to the highest degree powerful motivation ever. He had failed to plan for the Russian winter because he thought it would be a quick and easy victory, and ended up losing many men to col d and starvation, much as Napoleon had previously. Stalin had placed his trust in the wrong entity and was greatly disillusioned and was unprepared for the attack when it came. Again, the misperceptions of the leaders involved ended in a great loss of life. The third chapter deals with the Korean War and misperceptions of a different sort.In the later stages of the war, after the North Koreans were compulsive back to the 38th parallel, General Douglas MacArthur went beyond the original scope of the police action by driving toward Chinese touch along the Yalu River. This move provoked China and brought them into the conflict. MacArthur did not believe that the Chinese forces would be strong and thought he could achieve an easy victory. He ignored intelligence that told him the size of the Chinese ground forces and chose to believe that it was smaller than it really was.His hubris added both years to the war and cost 34,000 supererogatory American lives. Had he chosen to get wo rd to reality instead of his own misperceptions, many lives could have been saved. The Vietnam War was full of misperceptions as well. One of the biggest misperceptions would be the type of war being fought. The United States was fighting against communism, while the Vietnamese were fighting against imperialism and colonialism and to protect their mode of life. Had the United States never entered Vietnam, communism would have taken over earlier, and with fewer human lives wasted.In 1978, the Vietnamese communists invaded Cambodia to put a stop to the communist regime of Pol lav and the killing fields. Had the United States been open-minded plenty to see that there were distinctions between types of communists, perchance we would never have participated in the conflict. Dr. Stoessinger continues through several other wars including Milosevics pagan cleansing in Yugoslavia, the battles between India and Pakistan, the Arab-Israeli conflicts, ibn Talal Hussein Husseins wars in Ira n and capital of Kuwait and the current American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after the tragedy of 9/11.Dr. Stoessinger summarizes the book in the final chapter. Here he reiterates his thoughts that the case material reveals that possibly the most important single precipitating factor in the outbreak of war is misperception. He withal restates the dimensions of misperception and gives each one special attention. In regards to the idea that there is a misperception in a leaders self-view, Stoessinger notes that there is remarkable consistency in the self-images of most national leaders on the door of war.Each confidently expects victory after a brief and triumphant campaign. He in addition states that leaders on all sides typically harbor self-delusions on the eve of war. Stoessinger also discusses the idea that a leaders misperception of his adversarys power is perhaps the quintessential cause of war. It is vital to remember, besides that it is not the actual distribution of power that precipitates a war it is the way in which a leader thinks that power is distributed.Dr. Stoessinger uses many primary sources for his education including newspapers, documents, reports, and first-hand accounts. He also uses many secondary sources including books by other authors well-versed in the conflicts being discussed. It is very apparent that a contend of thought and look has gone into the creation of this book. The index is very complete and the bibliographies at the end of each chapter make it easy to find more information on the conflict at hand.I believe that this book has a lot of historical worth since it pulls from so many valid sources. It presents straightforward and factual information with knowledgeable interpretations of the information. I believe that Dr. Stoessinger has successfully accomplished what he has set out to do. I would recommend the book to others if they are looking for interpretations of war and how they begin. The book was interesting , though it could be a little wry at times to someone who is not well-versed in modern and contemporary history.